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DATA FOR PEACE: THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 1920-1940 
by David Lincove 
 
Abstract 
Based on Article 8 of the League of Nations Covenant, the League pursued a program to reduce 
and regulate national armaments to promote peace and security among nations.  An integral part 
of the program was compiling and disseminating data on national armaments holdings, arms 
trade, and natural resources used to make war.  The League anticipated that publishing and 
sharing arms data would contribute to an environment of greater transparency, international trust, 
and cooperation.  There was a genuine belief among many disarmament supporters that data 
could be used as a tool to influence public opinion and national leaders, and contribute to the 
Leagues’ negotiations for a disarmament agreement.  This philosophy of armaments data led to 
the publication and use of Armaments Year-Book and Statistical Year-Book of the Trade in Arms, 
Ammunition, and Implements of War, representing an approach to disarmament that set a precedent 
for the United Nations.  
 
Introduction 
In 1924 the League of Nations published the first editions of two annual data sources in support 
of its efforts to reduce national armaments and control the trade in arms in the years following 
World War I.  Armaments Year-Book offered a compilation of textual and tabular data on 
military organizations, armaments, and economics organized by countries of the world.   
Statistical Information on the Trade in Arms, Ammunition, and Material of War1 collected and 
published in tabular format the number and value of arms imported and exported by each nation.  
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Authorized by the League Council and General Assembly and compiled by the statistical experts 
in the Disarmament Section, these publications provided political and military leaders and the 
general public comparative tools to expose recent and long-term trends in stockpiling and trading 
armaments by individual nations.  The purpose of the data was to identify and question the 
purpose of an arms buildup and signal potential military threats, but a trend was only a limited 
predictor of future violence or peace between nations.  Leaders needed to discover the intentions 
behind a buildup of arms in combination with other factors, such as the type of weapons added to 
the stockpile, historical relationships between nations, and recent public statements from 
potential belligerents.  By making public the status of armaments in each country, the yearbooks 
served the League’s goals of transparency, trust, greater international understanding, and 
encouraging the power of public opinion for the promotion of peaceful solutions among nations 
in a difficult postwar environment marked by continuing military conflict and political and 
economic recovery.  In addition, the League intended the data to help establish starting points for 
disarmament negotiations and the regulation of the arms trade that would result in agreements.  
The potential agreements would serve as experimental, statistical models for the maintenance of 
an international balance of military power consistent with national defense requirements in each 
country.  
While recognizing that the League failed in its attempt to reach a disarmament agreement 
and prevent military aggression, this study argues that the data yearbooks served as vital 
resources for negotiations and public awareness as called for in Article 8 of the League of 
Nations Covenant.  In addition, the publications set a precedent for arms data compilation and 
dissemination to improve expert analysis and decision-making about limiting conventional 
weapons after World War II, when nuclear weapons further complicated the picture. Historical 




studies about the League’s disarmament programs investigate diplomacy, national politics, 
conferences, and efforts to negotiate a broad disarmament agreement. 2  When formal data 
publications are mentioned, they are discussed briefly or cited as sources of information.  This 
study contributes to the recent trend toward more nuanced interpretations that account for the 
League of Nations’ constructive contributions to international governance in the 1920s and 
1930s by shifting the focus of research from diplomacy to the League’s robust collection and use 
of data.3 It demonstrates the League’s full acceptance of international trends in formal data 
compilation and dissemination in its disarmament program, and throughout the organization, to 
promote community, mutual understanding, problem solving, and greater security and stability 
among nations.    
 The Armaments Year-Book and Statistical Information are, like the League of Nations 
itself, clearly artifacts of the Progressive movement. The faith in the value of statistical data grew 
out of European and American Progressive belief in the value of the state to solve problems and 
the broader movement towards “systematic international statistical reporting” that began in the 
nineteenth century and expanded during and after the war.4 League members, deeply influenced 
by the idea that intergovernmental organization and technical information could solve problems 
across borders, organized the International Statistical Commission (ISC) in June 1920. The move 
reflected the League’s confidence in statistical experts.  The ISC’s charge was to coordinate 
uniform methods and classification of international statistics, centralize statistical information, 
and ensure the continued cooperation of international organizations.  The commission also 
emphasized the professionalization of statistical work and the importance of seeking opinions of 
statisticians.   
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The League further developed its involvement with statistical methods and compilation in 
future conferences and publications focused on international economics, finance, labor, and 
industrial production. The ISC left the work on disarmament data to the League’s Disarmament 
Section, which created its own statistical staff and corps of statistical experts. In general, the 
greater emphasis on statistical compilation and dissemination, whether from government or 
intergovernmental organizations, was grounded with a social purpose.5  More centralized states 
meant a greater role for statisticians in “forecasting, monitoring and remedying social and 
economic ills.”6  In an article about the importance of statistics to the League published in 1921, 
Lucien March, director of France’s Statistique Générale and a member of the ISC, emphasized 
that “a precise knowledge of the economical and social condition of peoples, their strength and 
productive power, would be the best guaranty for universal peace.”  March believed that publicly 
available, international statistical information would generate greater understanding among 
citizens of different nations and create an atmosphere of mutual confidence and trust.7  March’s 
view was not new.  Similar ideas about the contribution of data to society were common in the 
nineteenth century, and despite the disaster of World War I, statisticians sought to promote the 
same ideas in efforts for peace.8 
Although the war weakened domestic Progressive movements for social and political 
reforms, support for a global organization for peace among nations grew with the help of 
prominent leaders.  President Woodrow Wilson and French political leader Léon Bourgeois 
represented the continuation of the liberal reform spirit for internationalism.  Wilson and 
Bourgeois could claim only limited success.  Wilson, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1919 
as the main architect of the League of Nations, suffered political defeat when the US Senate 
rejected the Treaty of Versailles and membership in the League.  The president’s critics, mainly 




Republicans who were not allowed to participate in treaty negotiations, opposed his 
compromises at the peace conference and any form of binding entanglements in international 
affairs.  In 1920 Bourgeois, a leader in the Radical-Socialist Party and a member of Parliament, 
became the first president of the League’s Council and also received the Nobel Peace Prize as the 
spiritual “father of the League.” 9 Despite the honor both the proponents of a punitive peace 
treaty and believers of an unrealistic “mystical promise of peace” resisted his philosophy of 
international solidarity, the arbitration of disputes, and an international military force.  Wilson 
was more influential than Bourgeois in framing the League, but both supported the concept of 
disarmament even though there would be no international army to enforce agreements.   
Dedicated support came from some conservatives as well, such as Lord Robert Cecil in 
Britain, described as the “foremost internationalist of his generation.”  On the issue of 
disarmament and dedication to the League of Nations Cecil’s Conservative Party colleagues 
viewed him as a maverick because of his attempt at independent policymaking in disarmament 
negotiations and his leadership within the League of Nations Union in Britain.10   
   President Wilson’s Fourteen Points for ending the war and rebuilding the postwar world 
served as a basis for the League Covenant, incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.  
Wilson emphasized the importance of mutual understanding, cooperation, and openness to 
control armaments and reduce the chances of a future war.  In Point Four he called for “adequate 
guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point 
consistent with domestic safety.”11  This idea appeared in Article 8 of the League Covenant that 
became part of the Treaty of Versailles, establishing that “Members of the League recognise that 
the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point 
consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international 
Data for Peace: The League of Nations and Disarmament 1920-1940 
6 
 
obligations.” Alongside mandates to formulate a plan for arms reduction and prevent unregulated 
arms trade was that “Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information 
as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of 
such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes.”12  
The mandate to exchange armaments data among members of the League of Nations was 
the operationalization of “moral disarmament,” one of the pillars supporting the League’s 
concept of open diplomacy and the maintenance of peace, and a hedge against resurgent postwar 
nationalism.13  Moral disarmament, defined as an atmosphere of mutual trust, confidence, 
understanding, and security among nations, was considered essential before the actual reduction 
of arms and the alleviation of social and economic postwar problems could be accomplished.14  
A British secretary at the signing of the Lacarno agreements in October 1925 quoted Belgian 
socialist Foreign Minister Emile Verdervelde who offered a hopeful vision of the future: 
“tomorrow I am convinced that it will be relaxation, confidence and moral disarmament — the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of material disarmament.”15 The League hoped that the 
exchange and dissemination of armaments information would achieve the reduction in postwar 
tensions and conflict it envisioned in drafting Article 8, but it recognized that distributing League 
documents and news releases about disarmament might help generate support from the citizenry 
and the press in each country. Newspapers were a vital resource that a 1925 League resolution 
refers to as “the most effective means of guiding public opinion towards that moral 
disarmament.”16   
Idealistic efforts to reduce international tensions and promote an environment for 
disarmament were complicated from the beginning of the League in 1920.  Progress on 
disarmament suffered from the absence of Germany, Russia, and the United States.  More 




important was the conflict between the idealism of an intergovernmental project to reduce arms 
and eliminate wars and the realism of national sovereignty and security.  Even as the League 
sought agreements on disarmament and regulating the arms trade, few nations, particularly the 
great powers, would relinquish control over their national security policies.   This attitude 
underlined the growing distrust and uncertainty about postwar national security, economic and 
social distress, and continued wars in Eastern Europe, Turkey, Greece, and Armenia.  The 
League attempted unsuccessfully to enhance international security through multinational 
agreements to avoid war and improve the chances of disarmament and arms trade regulation in 
the future.17  Furthermore, the League lacked the military power to stop aggression, and national 
leaders held differing conceptions of national security and national interests.   
The League of Nations sought a formula for general disarmament by establishing 
administrative agencies within the Disarmament Section. It created the Permanent Advisory 
Commission on Military, Naval, and Air Questions (PAC) in May 1920 composed of military 
experts from nations on the Council.  Among the various responsibilities of the PAC were the 
control of the arms trade and investigating approaches to reducing national armaments as 
mandated by Articles 8 and 23 of the Covenant.  The PAC drew criticism for its inability to 
make progress and project a sense of urgency to make disarmament a reality as expected by the 
public.18  This led to the creation of the Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments (TMC) 
by the League Assembly in December 1920 but it did not meet until July 16-18, 1921.  The TMC 
consisted of independent civilian representatives chosen by the League Council for their 
experience in political, social, economic affairs; military representatives from the PAC; and 
experts from economic, financial, and labor committees of the League. 19 The League charged 
the TMC to investigate and make proposals to the Council consistent with Article 8 of the 
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Covenant.  This meant creating an international exchange of data on national armaments and 
drafting agreements to reduce armaments and the international trade in arms by private 
manufactures and dealers.   
The TMC became an object of criticism from its beginning.  The Council intended the 
PAC and the TMC to cooperate to achieve progress on disarmament and the arms trade, but 
points of conflict arose over status and responsibilities.  Conflict originated from the TMC’s 
charge to bring in experts to analyze and propose solutions and to organize a center for gathering 
data on armaments.  In a report of February 25, 1921 French Councilman Léon Bourgeois 
reported that the PAC already had the authority to use additional experts.  He emphasized that 
“the Commission is not hindered in its work by any lack of expert knowledge, but rather by the 
Governments and the conditions laid down by them with regard to any understanding relating to 
a definite reduction of armaments.”20  Additional conflict ensued over the presence of PAC 
members on the TMC and the method of exchanging data on armaments.  The PAC concluded 
that a new organization to coordinate international exchanges mandated by Article 8 of the 
Covenant was “superfluous and futile” for nations that signed the Covenant agreement. Rather 
than systematically gather data on all member nations, a more valuable approach would be to 
gather data in geographic danger zones where nations were in conflict, and the PAC could 
organize the exchanges between the great powers.21  The Council rejected this alternate 
approach.  
  Broader criticism of the TMC came from military and government leaders who viewed 
the private citizens on the commission as incompetent, potentially too idealistic, and not 
officially representing their governments’ positions.  Both the French and British governments 
were wary of the freedom given private citizens to affect League policy proposals through the 




TMC, and the French sought to hinder its progress.  In Andrew Webster’s analysis of the TMC 
he concluded that its “independent representatives must thus be seen as, at best, semi-state actors 
trying to serve two masters, both the League disarmament vision and their own national 
interests.”22  Despite the structural criticism of the TMC the League Assembly insisted on a 
group independent of their government and military establishments and able to offer creative 
ideas and solutions.  Eventually criticism from the PAC and lack of government political support 
led to its reorganization with a new purpose in 1924 as the Co-ordination Commission with no 
power to propose policy.23 
The Council’s optimism placed in the makeup of the TMC can be explained not only by 
its bold approach in the involvement of persons from different nations who were not bound by 
political and military establishments, but also the League’s emphasis on making use of 
independent experts in statistics, economics, banking, labor, and government.  The focus on 
experts developed from the prewar period of Progressive reform, the reliance during the war on 
economic and technical information, and the rise of professional and philanthropic elite 
associations.  In the League a “commitment to impartial inquiry had developed, unencumbered 
by national electoral politics.”  There was a belief that experts could produce a “truly democratic 
and scientifically sound international order.”24  Reliance on experts indicated the complex nature 
of disarmament that involved cooperation among different parts of society both internationally 
and within nations.  For most of its three years of existence the TMC was chaired by Algerian- 
born attorney and French socialist politician René Viviani.  Among other expert representatives 
were former Italian foreign minister, politician and financier Carlo Schanzer; Italian professional 
statistician Rodolpho Benini; Belgian economist and banker Albert Janssen; and Romanian 
attorney and economic “technical delegate” Demetre Jancovici.25 
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Although the PAC considered developing a questionnaire in 1920 to compile data on 
armaments, it was not until 1921, with the appointment of the TMC, that a move to gather 
information began. The data would provide a basis for understanding the status of peacetime 
armaments and military expenditures in each nation, and it would help direct efforts toward 
political and military solutions to reduce arms budgets and purchases. The information would 
help create a process within the League for negotiating an appropriate balance of armaments and 
peacefully resolving serious disagreements that might lead to violence among nations.26  
 TMC members appreciated the complex nature of international disarmament and realized that 
there were serious impediments to meeting the mandate of Article 8 of the Covenant.  In 
September 1921 the TMC reported that “of all the problems confronting the League of Nations 
none is more difficult than the problem of Disarmament, for armaments depend upon policy, 
policy upon circumstance, and circumstance varies from country to country, and from year to 
year.”27 The commission considered a proposal in 1922 by member Viscount Esher (Reginald 
Brett) of Britain who suggested that disarmament and greater international security could be 
expedited by the reduction of domestic armies and air forces based on statistical ratios similar to 
the ratios considered at the Washington naval conference in 1922.  General lack of support from 
the TMC and PAC for a scheme using “co-efficients chosen in an arbitrary manner” led him to 
withdraw it and he resigned from the TMC in 1923. Despite this rejection, the TMC viewed 
Esher’s ideas as emphasizing the importance of gathering data on current national arms holdings.  
Alternatively, Robert Cecil, who joined the TMC in Spring 1922, proposed mutual defense 
agreements to achieve a sense of security as a precondition for the actual reduction of arms.  It 
was Cecil’s idea, to lay a foundation of trust as necessary for disarmament to be acceptable, that 
was taken up by the League.28    




The TMC accepted Carlo Schanzer’s idea to gather quantitative and qualitative 
information on the state of postwar national armaments.  It stated that statistics were “the only 
sound basis on which a criterion for dealing practically with the problem of disarmament can 
rest…Doubtless, statistics are in themselves inadequate to solve the question of armaments, but 
they are necessary in order to achieve the aim which we are pursuing.”29  TMC chairman Viviani 
added that equality in military manpower and expenditure is not “proof of equality of strength” 
due to the complexity of geopolitical, economic, and historical differences between nations.30  
Viviani’s comment alludes to the complicated issue of qualitative analysis in disarmament, such 
as the use of a weapon for offensive or defensive purposes and the type and power of armaments 
deployed.  
Between the summer of 1921 and the fall of 1924 a series of recommendations by the 
TMC and decisions by the League Council and Assembly led to the development of the League’s 
first general compilation of international armament statistics.31  Initially conducted by surveying 
government and military officials throughout the world, the League wanted to get an idea of 
what governments believed they required for their national security. It also sought a better 
understanding of the changes in national armaments since 1913, and the “tendency” or trend in 
each country toward reducing or increasing military manpower, arms used for war, military 
expenditures, and strength of the economic sectors that support war.  The first compilation was a 
preliminary study published in September 1922 that focused on defense expenditure data from 
twenty-one League member nations that completed the survey.  The TMC went further with a 
follow up compilation that covered budget expenditures for defense and an accounting of armed 
forces and major arms for each national army, navy, and air force as of January 1923.  The data 
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were based on both a survey of nations and a compilation of expenditures for 1921-1923 
published in official sources.32   
These early statistical compilations of armaments led to the TMC’s recommendation to 
the League Assembly in June 1923 to publish an up-to-date and complete yearbook.33  The 
commission rejected reliance on surveys in favor of more complete and expeditious use of data 
found in existing official and public documents.  Its revised procedures for compiling data also 
relied on sharing completed drafts of armaments data with military attachés in Paris.  Attachés 
could forward their country’s data to appropriate military authorities who might propose 
supplementary information.  In this process the League sought to “preserve the independence of 
the Secretariat” so that it would not be viewed as a propaganda tool for any government.34  
As conceived by the Disarmament Section a yearbook of arms data would partially fulfill the 
League’s mandate in Article 8 of the Covenant to encourage the open exchange of information 
related to armaments held and expenditures from as many countries as possible.  An annual data 
source would also reflect potential military power by compiling national data on “wealth in raw 
materials and their industrial power”35 and alert nations to arms buildups by potential enemies on 
their borders.  The TMC reported that “from a moral point of view, however, the effect of such 
exchanges would be considerable.  Article 8 of the Covenant was not drawn up with a view of 
facilitating the work of [military] general staffs.  Its object was to improve the political 
atmosphere by creating confidence… [and] open dealings, instead of mutual distrust.”  The 
philosophy of openness implicit in this exchange of information and symbolized by the planned 
yearbook “would render it possible to nip in the bud any campaign started by an alarmist Press 
and based upon the armaments of countries considered as potential enemies.”36  
 





The chief editor of Armaments Year-Book throughout its publication history was Nokhim 
Sloutzki,37 a native of Ukraine who earned a degree in Law from the University of Geneva in 
May 1917.  Considered a “stateless ex-Russian,” he received a Nansen passport in a program 
begun in 1922.38  Beginning in April 1921 Sloutzki worked for a few months with the League of 
Nations in Geneva on the staff of the Economic and Financial Section.  His work on trade and 
production of raw materials and foodstuffs before and after the war brought him in contact with 
Italian statisticians Corrado Gini and Felice Vinci.39  After a few months with the International 
Labour Organization in Geneva, he went back to the League in March 1922 as a statistician with 
the Disarmament Section where he worked from 1922 to 1940.  He remained employed by the 
League until its final days in April, 1946 and then joined the staff of the United Nations working 
on armaments issues. Sloutzki wrote that he was “closely involved with both the technical work 
done by the League and the political efforts, under League auspices, to develop central control 
systems for the international trade in armaments.”40  He also published books and journal articles 
about arms limitation and disarmament.41 
Armaments Year-Book appeared in 1924 in English and French (Annuaire Militaire). The 
English edition with 844 pages was available as part of the League’s documentary series by 
subscription.  Publishing agents such as Britain’s Constable and Company LTD and later by 
George Allen and Unwin LTD distributed the yearbook worldwide in both cloth binding and 
paperback.42  At this time no other reference work like it was available.  Before the war, 
beginning in 1874, a guide to national militaries and arms had appeared in German edited by 
Colonel Heinrich von Löbell.  Under varying titles and editors, Löbell’s Jahresberichte über die 
Veränderungen und Fortschritte im Militärwesen [Löbell's Annual Reports on Changes and Progress 
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in the Military] appeared in forty-eight volumes until 1935 with a gap during and after the war 
when it reappeared in 1926.  The guide offered evaluations and statistical data on military 
capabilities in most countries.43 A reviewer praised the work in 1926 for its depth of information, 
unique critical approach, and impartiality.44 Löbell’s had an organization similar to the League’s 
yearbook with a combination of extensive text and statistical tables arranged by nation, but the 
German work also included a topical section.   
The editors of Armaments Year-Book explained their methodology for the compilation in 
each edition, but it was not until the Preface of the final edition, published in early 1940 in the 
midst of a new war, that they addressed the value of the work.  The yearbook was described as 
“authentic” and published with “complete objectiveness… [and] authority” compared with 
inaccurate information appearing in the world press.45  There was no doubt that countries 
withheld data but the League hoped that sufficient data would be openly available to illustrate 
realistic trends over time in the reduction or increase of armament holdings and expenditures.  
The editors of the 1940 edition offered strong justification of the great effort by the League to 
provide the information despite its failure to halt a new arms buildup and the onset of a new war 
that began while they compiled the new edition.  
In the 1924 yearbook the editors organized the work in three parts, “Military Forces 
(Land, Sea and Air),” “Budget Expenditures on National Defense,” and “Industries capable of 
being used for War Purposes.”  In each section League member nations and nonmembers 
appeared in alphabetical order. The editors provided descriptive text and statistical data broken 
down into detailed categories, such as military organization, number of arms of various types, 
military schools, naval tonnage by ship type, and aircraft.  Budget data relating to national 
defense were presented raw from the original sources without attempting to standardize the 




information using a basis for measurement, such as converting all monetary figures to French 
francs.  The third section printed non-standardized data about the output, imports, and exports of 
industries providing vital raw materials of military importance, such as coal, petroleum, ores, 
metals, chemicals, cotton, and rubber.  A brief section of disarmament agreements and data 
sources appeared at the end of each chapter.   
The data sources for the information varied greatly depending on the data made public by 
each country.  In the 1924 volume the work covered thirty-seven nations.  For Albania no 
published sources were used and editors relied on data supplied by the government which 
reported that there were barely enough arms for the 10,691 soldiers and gendarmerie in the 
country. For the Soviet Union only a few sources were available, such as the newspaper Izvestia, 
Soviet laws and decrees, and a government publication on the organization of the army.  From 
these documents the yearbook provided, for example, information on the organization and 
composition of the Red Army and its system of recruitment and training, but no statistics 
appeared on the number of soldiers in the ranks.  Only one statistical table was included listing 
numbers of naval vessels, such as the country’s three battleships and cruisers weighing 70,110 
tons.  Data for Japan originated from direct communications with the Japanese government and 
existing statistical publications, such as The Japan Year-Book and Annual Return of the Foreign 
Trade of the Empire of Japan.  Among the large amount of data was a figure showing Japan’s 
expenditures for the Army and Navy had decreased from 649,750,000 Yen in 1920/21 to an 
estimated 483,782,000 Yen in 1923/24, but the apparent decrease can be interpreted differently 
depending on price indexes shown for 1913 versus 1920.46   
The sections of the yearbook for Great Britain and the British colonies were extensive.  
Among the sources for Britain were parliamentary documents with budget estimates and 
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appropriations to the military, Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective Services for the 
Year 1924-1925, and communications with government agencies. Information about the colonies 
and protectorates excluding India appeared separately, but there was one source list, mainly the 
Notes on the Land Forces of the British Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates published by the 
War Office of the British government. The chapter on India, for example, included a large 
section with detailed statistics on the organization of British and Indian forces, such as a total 
fighting force of 235,652 soldiers among whom there were 144,617 Indian officers and men in 
rank.47   
Data on the United States were plentiful and originated from published national budgets, 
statutes, military regulations and reports, the Statistical Abstract of the United States, and other 
published government documents.  Among the data are detailed tables showing active army and 
national guard strength in mid-1923, and a table showing the estimated decrease in defense 
expenditures from $598,937,000 to $548,531,000 between 1922/23 and 1924/25 with price 
indexes shown for 1913 and 1922/23.48   
During the years that the Armaments Year-Book appeared, the editors sought to expand 
participating states and update the information. The number of nations represented increased 
from thirty-seven in 1924 to fifty-seven in the 1925/1926 edition, reaching a high mark of sixty-
four in 1933.  That number held steady until the final edition of 1939/1940 contained information 
for sixty-three states. With the exception of the special edition of 1932 discussed below, the 
editors sought to maintain consistency in the presentation and organization of the textual and 
tabular data.  Organizational changes over the years included the expansion of the section of 
relevant agreements, treaties and conventions, maps, graphs, and statistical tables.  The widely 
varied sources, currencies, measurement standards, classification of weapons, amounts of 




information for different countries, and the need to translate from documents in many languages 
demonstrated the massive amount of work required to compile and organize the yearbook.49  The 
data could be difficult to interpret, but from the perspective of contemporary and future 
researchers, the yearbook served as a guide to historical data resources published by each 
country. 
Government and public interest in Armaments Year-Book was evident from its use by 
public officials and the press.  An indirect reference to the yearbook appeared in August 1926 in 
a letter from Walter Roberts, a British representative at League discussion of the Preparatory 
Commission, to Foreign Minister Austen Chamberlain. Roberts mentioned that documents 
prepared by both Italian and French delegations agreed that the yearbook would serve as a useful 
resource for control of armaments.  The Italian document stated that it was “the only practicable 
or desirable method of control” compared with investigative commissions of enquiry.50  The 
yearbook was clearly cited for statistical data in other British foreign policy documents during 
the period of the world disarmament conference in 1933 and 1934 related to negotiations on the 
level of naval armaments51 and German parity with other European armies and air forces.52   
British cabinet proceedings also reveal use of data from the yearbook to demonstrate the military 
needs of the Committee of Imperial Defence in an environment of decreasing British arms 
expenditures while there were increases among the other great powers between 1925 and 1933.  
Reliance on the yearbook was also clear when the Foreign Office cited data on air forces of 
several nations and compared it to what seemed to be exaggerated figures reported by Hitler’s 
regime in the spring of 1935.53 
References to data in the yearbook appeared in the debates of the British House of 
Commons and the US Congress.  On November 11, 1936 Britain’s Under Secretary of State for 
Data for Peace: The League of Nations and Disarmament 1920-1940 
18 
 
Air Sir Philip Sassoon responded to a request for the “ratio of aeroplane and seaplane strength of 
Great Britain as compared with that of France, Germany, and Italy.”  Sassoon referred the 
representative to the recently published Armaments Year-Book.  Three years later in early May, 
1939 Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was asked to produce a white paper comparing 
compulsory conscription data from European nations.  Chamberlain, citing Armaments Year-
Book, said, “in these circumstances I do not think that the labour involved in the preparation of a 
White Paper would be justified.”54  Similar use of the yearbook occurred in Congress.  In June 
1932 Mississippi Democratic Representative Ross Collins introduced tables from several 
editions of the yearbook to demonstrate that the House should not provide excessive funding to 
the War Department given comparative data from other nations.55  
The number of references to the yearbook in British cabinet and foreign policy 
documents, the House of Commons, and in the US Congress was modest, although use may have 
been higher than is obvious from citations because there were instances when statistics were 
quoted with no clear source. This use of the yearbook offers an indication that government 
officials relied on it as an important source of information to assist with disarmament 
policymaking.  The usefulness of the yearbook to national decision makers cannot, however, be 
accurately measured with references.  Instead, we can understand the importance of the data 
source from the broader disarmament discussion and popular interest in the publication, both of 
which clarify the central place of numerical comparisons in armaments negotiations.  The data 
was very important to detect national arms buildups over time, but no matter what the data 
revealed, its completeness could be questioned, and it would never overrule national sovereignty 
for purposes of security. 




Popular references to the yearbook appeared in newspapers and magazines offering 
reviews, letters, and news.  Most of the reviews were positive, praising it as a useful reference 
source that clarified the great sums of money spent and the types of armaments that nations 
considered necessary to maintain their defenses in the postwar environment.56  American lawyer 
and internationalist Raymond Fosdick referred to the yearbook’s “scientific approach to the 
problem of disarmament.  It is essential spade work in laying the foundations of peace.”57  
Authors cited the yearbook in a variety of scholarly and popular periodicals in political science 
and international affairs from the 1920s to the 2000s in source lists or when reference was made 
to the level of armaments held by a nation.58  In a review of the 1925-1926 edition Philip Noel 
Baker, a British Labour Party member, disarmament expert, and Professor of International 
Relations at the University of London, declared it “the most complete manual of its kind that 
there has ever been.”  It is “worth the expense and trouble…for it helps us more clearly to realize 
what are the armaments which we discuss so vaguely, though so much.”59  In August 1928 the 
New York Times gave an entire page with maps, charts, and a graph illustrating the tremendous 
cost of arms as revealed in the most recent yearbook and the writer wondered whether the public 
would accept their leaders’ explanation that disarmament is insoluble.60  When the 1937 volume 
appeared, the editor of The Times of London noted that even though it was impossible to secure 
accurate data on German and Italian arms, “the volume, like its predecessors, is indispensable to 
those who require to have the data available as to the armies, navies, and air-forces of the 
world.”61   
Whether the yearbook was used by the media or by government, it “became,” according 
to historian Andrew Webster, “an essential and well-respected source,”62 that served the League 
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of Nations’ purpose to publicize international arms information and attempt to reduce the impact 
of rumor and propaganda.      
Critics emphasized the limitations of the information in Armaments Year-Book, 
particularly that data for two or more nations were difficult to compare due to differences in 
definitions of terms (e.g. battleship), standards of measurement (e.g. petroleum), and their 
qualitative value of offensive or defensive weapons. Just as important, the publication could not 
include data withheld as secret by countries and it could be out of date by the time it was 
published.  In a review of the 1930 edition Lt. Col. Georges-Eugène Lestien, professor at l'École 
Supérieure de Guerre, pointed out the lack of information on German armaments compared with 
smaller nations.63  Noting the lack of published data, Denys Myers, research director of the 
World Peace Foundation, believed that “this condition of calculated misrepresentation [by 
national leaders] was so deeply impressed upon the whole area of the problem that… there has 
been a constant emphasis upon bringing to light what states are doing, allegedly in the name of 
national defense.”64  In 1935 William T. Stone, vice-president of the Foreign Policy Association 
and armaments expert, believed that the yearbook was useful but criticized it for data that was 
“sketchy and inadequate or sadly out of date.”  It lacked information on “the huge stocks of war 
material, such as guns, tanks and ammunition built up by the great powers during the past 
decade. It is impossible, from the scanty figures in the Year-Book, to estimate the actual strength 
of the air forces of the principal powers, or the reserve strength of the armed forces of those 
countries which maintain the conscript system.”65  
The most dramatic changes to the yearbook appeared temporarily in the 1932 edition in 
preparation for the World Disarmament Conference and emphasized the importance of data in 
the negotiations.  Disarmament documentation related to work of the Preparatory Commission 




for the Disarmament Conference (1926 to 1932) and in the proceedings of the conference (1932-
1934) often contained discussions on defining which armaments to measure and comparing 
statistical data based on conditions in each country.   There was no consensus on the status and 
trends in the numbers of soldiers in various ranks, the number of tanks and military aircraft, sizes 
of airplane engines, tonnage and nation-to-nation ratios of naval destroyers and cruisers, military 
expenditures, and arms manufacturing. 66  Britain’s delegate, Arthur Henderson, who was 
president of the conference, announced at its opening session on February 2, 1932 that an 
agreement on these details would save governments billions of dollars in arms expenditures.67 
For the convenience of the conference delegates, the special edition of Armaments Year-Book 
contained more concise information than past editions on each country’s armaments, military 
expenditures, and the organization and composition of military forces.  Delegates received a 
copy and it was available for purchase by the public.68  Much of the data came from a special 
survey that requested data according to a consistent measurement standard for specific values, 
such as monetary value of military expenditures or tonnage of destroyers.  For example, in 1931 
Italy held seventy-five submarines with a total “standard displacement” tonnage of 53,664 
compared with 110 submarines with a tonnage of 97,875 held by France.  With the use of more 
standardized measures the League sought a valid basis for comparing data, but the editors 
admitted that it was “impossible” to compare certain data over time, such as “effectives” [ie. data 
on military manpower] shown in the survey with data derived from budgetary information 
appearing in previous yearbooks. 69   Forty-eight governments, including the United States, 
reported data.70    
Denys Myers, research director of the World Peace Foundation, described the new 
compilation effort as “the first time in history official records of armed strengths on a 
Data for Peace: The League of Nations and Disarmament 1920-1940 
22 
 
comparable basis” was attempted.  The new data compilation from a survey resulted in 
substantial differences with previous editions of the yearbook based on published sources.  Yet 
Myers admitted that even the new survey data could be difficult to compare due to technical 
differences among nations in reporting information.  Despite the problems Myers conceded that 
the new data system was a great improvement, and he expected Armaments Year-Book to use the 
new compilation model in future issues.71  Although the same survey data related to military 
personnel also appeared in the 1933 and 1934 editions of the yearbook along with information 
from publications, it would not be repeated afterwards.  
The TMC’s other annual data compilation edited by Nokhim Sloutzki, Statistical 
Information on the Trade in Arms, began publication in September, 1924 in English and French 
(Renseignements Statistiques sur le Commerce des Armes, Munitions, et Matériel de Guerre).  
As with its counterpart, the yearbook followed the mandate for the international exchange of 
information and it reinforced a program of publicity and transparency, but it was initiated in 
response to the failure of the arms trade Convention of St. Germain in 1919.  The League 
Assembly asked the TMC to prepare a new proposal limiting the arms trade and to compile data 
on the value, quantity, and destination of arms and munitions exported and imported.  Editors 
derived the data from trade statistics published by each country pertaining to infantry weapons 
and explosives leaving out large items such as warships and artillery.  The 1924 edition provided 
data for twenty-three nations, and this number grew to fifty-nine nations plus colonies, 
protectorates, and mandated territories in the final edition in September, 1938.72 For example, the 
1926 edition showed that between 1920 and 1924 Bulgaria, allied with the Central Powers in the 
past war, was mainly an importer of explosive munitions and that the value of those imports 
increased from 1,422,900 Levas to 9,652,900 Levas.  The amount of explosive munitions 




purchased increased from 15.76 metric tons to 84.84 metric tons.  By 1924 Germany and France 
were the sources of 75% of Bulgaria’s imports of this material.  The last edition of the yearbook 
revealed that Bulgaria’s purchases of munitions were very large in 1935 (e.g. 602.19 metric tons 
for rifle and revolver cartridges alone) compared with other years from 1933 to 1937, and their 
main arms supplier continued to be Germany with Italy, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia 
surpassing France.73 This data was derived from Statistique du Commerce Extérieur (Sofia). 
Sloutzki explained that the information in Statistical Year-Book of the Trade in Arms was 
“designed to serve as a working instrument for various bodies of the League in charge of 
preparing a convention on arms traffic control.” He recognized there were serious flaws in the 
data due to differing ways nations compiled their data and the dynamics of arms trade.   There 
was no uniformity in the nomenclature of arms trade statistics, and reporting of data was 
inconsistent and unreliable.  Trade statistics did not show local manufacture of arms that 
remained in the country of origin.  Despite the flaws in the yearbook, Sloutzki believed that 
recognizing the expansion or reduction of arms exports and imports over the course of several 
years was more important than whether the statistics were completely accurate.74  Trends in the 
national import of armaments might raise questions about the military and political motivations 
of a country’s leaders, particularly if an arms buildup was occurring. 
American journalist John Gunther offered one of the few reviews of the arms trade 
yearbook.  Gunther wrote a mixed review of the 1935 yearbook he described as “woefully 
inadequate.  It gives only the figures that various governments wish to be published; it’s always 
out of date; it does not include really expensive items like battleships and airplanes; and it takes 
no account of smuggling….However, it is the best thing we have and, despite its deficiencies, it 
contains some pearls of information.”75  The fact that it had some usefulness was why it was 
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cited twice in the British House of Commons debates on British arms sales to South America 
during the Chaco War and at least once in a Foreign Office communication regarding Chinese 
disregard for British arms dealers.76 
Sloutzki believed that Armaments Year-Book and Statistical Year-Book of the Trade in 
Arms were complimentary by presenting a broad approach to publicizing the state of armaments 
in each country and providing an information system that would contribute to a full evaluation of 
the quantity, quality, and purpose of armaments.  He noted that the public showed little 
engagement with disarmament discussions because it was too complex.  The arms trade 
yearbook “shared the fate of most of the League of Nations’ Secretariat publications.  These 
were of interest exclusively to governments, certain public libraries, a few specialized journals, 
and the individuals who kept abreast of the proceedings of the League of Nations.”  If there was 
any chance that the public could have influenced their governments to bring a halt to increasing 
armaments, the arms trade yearbook would have needed a complete overhaul and the publication 
of a special edition with less focus on statistical data for the public.77  In a 1941 publication, 
Sloutzki wrote that after general and complete disarmament there would be no need for either 
yearbook.  More realistically and with possible bitterness about unsuccessful efforts for 
disarmament, he noted, “their aim was to show how, in peace time, the world prepared for war; 
once the war had broken out, the Year-Books had no further reason to exist.”78 
By 1934, the failure of the World Disarmament Conference was a foregone conclusion 
given the irreconcilable disagreements and Hitler’s decision in October 1933 to withdraw 
Germany from the conference and the League.  The lack of agreement prior to Hitler coming to 
power was due to the complicated details of the negotiations.  Disarmament negotiations 
required nations to decide the number and quality of weapons necessary for each country, but 




reaching an agreement was fraught with difficulty.  Specific problems involved defining 
terminology, the size of national military forces, military training, geography, communication 
networks, boundaries, fortifications, and national image.79  The reality was “their need to equate 
different types and numbers of weapons and, then, meet their unique military requirements 
concerning both international security and national sovereignty.”80  Germany had been secretly 
rearming for years and unsuccessfully pushing for arms parity with other great powers.  After 
taking power, Hitler rebuked unfair disarmament negotiations and publicly announced his 
intention to rearm Germany in violation of previous treaty agreements.  Zara Steiner refers to the 
“myth of disarmament” in an environment of rearmament, and she points to this public failure of 
the League as “its singular discredit.”81  Sloutzki recalled that by 1935 the Disarmament Section 
“virtually ceased its activities.”82   
Despite the reduction of the League’s disarmament activities, Armaments Year-Book 
persisted every year until its final issue in early 1940 after a new war had already started in 
Europe.  Statistical Year-Book of the Trade in Arms also continued until its last issue in 1938.  
Both publications illustrated the dangerous build up of armaments in the few years prior to the 
onset of war in September 1939.  In 1935 William T. Stone noted in his review of the new 
edition of Armaments Year-Book that it revealed increased arms expenditures by $40 billion 
during the past ten years, with increases ranging from 25 percent for France to 388 percent for 
Japan, despite the League’s Covenant and years of effort for disarmament.83  The 1939/1940 
Armaments Year-Book revealed that the total expenditures for national defense in Italy increased 
from 5,247 million Lire in 1934/1935 to an estimated 13,593.8 million Lire in 1938/1939.  Based 
on price inflation factored (1929-30 =100), expenditures increased 31.6 percent (76 to 100) in 
four years.84   
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The continued publication of armaments data supplied evidence of the world’s buildup of 
arms, but the data may also have been viewed with a glimmer of hope and encouraged the 
League to persist.  Although the world seemed to be on a path to a new war, Sloutzki believed 
that the continuation of the Statistical Year-Book of the Trade in Arms provided broad 
knowledge of arms trafficking that might influence public opinion and encourage nations to pull 
back from the brink of disaster.  The armaments race could be measured best with exports of 
weapons, military expenditures, and strength of armed forces.85  In an explanation for the 
League’s unwillingness give up its disarmament efforts, former Deputy-General of the League of 
Nations Frank P. Walters wrote, “it was characteristic of the League of Nations that it was never 
ready to confess to defeat in any important purpose…It must always be ready to try again.”86   
Despite the positive spirit, in 1939 the Disarmament Section became part of the Department of 
General Affairs in a broad cost-cutting move by the League, and the documentation generated on 
behalf of disarmament diminished substantially. 
 
LEGACIES 
When the United Nations replaced the League of Nations in 1946, the new organization sought 
to correct the perceived deficiencies of the League’s structure and way of operating, but the UN 
was fundamentally rooted in the League’s internationalism. The UN accepted the League’s goal 
of promoting peace and security through multilateralism, transparency in arms holdings and 
trade, moral and material disarmament, collective security, and a greater sense of community and 
shared human values.  Much of the League’s work in international social and economic affairs, 
its use of experts, and its philosophy of organization and forums for the discussion of ideas and 
the settlement of international disputes, became part of the UN’s program from its conception.   




The UN carried on the idea of the “primacy of expert advice in the new specialist agencies [that] 
represented the continued power of the idea that the world could be directed by using figures, 
numbers, and statistical categories.”87   
The compilation of data on national armaments was not a priority for the UN, although 
Article 11 of the UN Charter gave the General Assembly the right to consider principles for 
reducing and regulating armaments, and Article 26 established that the Security Council would 
consult with the Military Staff Committee to “establishment of a system for the regulation of 
armaments.”88 The General Assembly passed resolutions favoring arms control and data 
collection and dissemination as early as December 1946.89  The US proposed in April 1952 that 
any system of “guaranteed disarmament” must include “progressive disclosure and verification 
on a continuing basis of all armed force.”90  A return to organizing and publishing international 
arms data on a large scale was delayed for decades, possibly because of the  data published by 
private organizations, particularly the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the US government.91  The UN did not act 
until it published aggregate data on national defense expenditures in the Yearbook of National 
Account Statistics beginning in 1957.   
The UN began publishing detailed, national armaments data in 1981 with Military 
Expenditures in Standardized Form Reported by States in annual reports to the Secretary 
General.  This was intended as a first step in a concerted effort to persuade nations to reduce 
their expenditures on arms, much like the League developed its data sources as a psychological 
foundation for disarmament negotiations.  The UN’s focus on lowering military expenditures, 
supported by the Soviet Union, occurred just before the presidential inauguration of Ronald 
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Reagan who supported and implemented large increases in the US defense budget.  The report is 
now known as the UN Report on Military Expenditures.92   
In 1992 the UN Register of Conventional Arms became operational compiling data by 
country for seven weapon categories, including battle tanks, armed combat vehicles, combat 
aircraft, attack helicopters, large caliber artillery, warships, and missiles and missile launchers.  
The data covers exports and imports, local weapons production, and weapons holdings.  The UN 
added small arms to the register in 2003.  Associated with the register is The Global Reported 
Arms Trade.  Both contain data reported by UN member states in accordance with the standards 
and definitions of trade in each nation.  The motivation for the Register developed in the 
aftermath of the first Gulf War, a conflict partially blamed on the huge buildup of armaments in 
Iraq.  Although the UN initially sought greater control over the trade in destabilizing arms, 
problems related to defining which arms would be regulated and opposition from arms 
manufactures led only to the implementation of the Register.  This minimal approach to the 
problem of arms proliferation pursued the same approach as the League of Nations with its 
emphasis on transparency and the danger of the destabilizing accumulation of arms.93     
Usually positive assessments of the League focus on its efforts in areas other than 
disarmament, such as international health improvement, labor relations, and eliminating opium 
smuggling and slavery.  Even though the League failed in its efforts to reduce armaments and 
maintain international peace after World War I, arms data served as a logical and essential 
information tool in the quest for the reduction of arms as a major contributor to the maintenance 
of peace.  The belief in the value of compiling and disseminating data about world armaments 
provided a basis for disarmament discussions by offering information to compare national arms 
positions and find appropriate levels of arms for peacetime defense.  Governments and the press 




used the data because they viewed the yearbooks as trusted sources.  However, the varied and 
complicated nature of the information made its value theoretical.  National self-interests and 
sovereignty, international distrust, and rivalries for power were real, compared with theoretical 
ratios of specific armaments and expenditures.      
Nevertheless, the League of Nations’ experience with arms data compilation and 
dissemination established patterns of thinking and organization that emphasized the role of 
expert, unbiased data collection in international discussions, and decision making on arms 
limitation and national security.  Data served the League’s attempts to create an environment 
conducive to international trust and security through moral disarmament, and the experience 
influenced future arms control efforts and set a precedent for similar efforts after World War II.  
The influence is evident in data publication by private organizations, government, and the United 
Nations.  Scholars continue to cite Armaments Year-Book and Statistical Year-Book of the Trade 
in Arms or sources that rely on them.94  This is a legacy of the League, to compile and 
disseminate national armaments data to promote peace in the interwar years.   
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